LIBEL
ELEMENTS:
1. That there must be an
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status, or circumstances.
2. That the imputation must be
made publicly.
3. That it must be malicious.
4. That the imputation must be
directed at a natural or juridical person, or one who is dead.
5. That the imputation must
tend to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of the person defamed.
Notes:
Character of the
words used to make it defamatory.
Words calculated
to induce suspicion are more effective in destroying reputation than false
charges directly made. Ironical and metaphorical language is a favored vehicle
for slander. A charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce
the hearer to suppose and understand that the person against whom they are
uttered is guilty of certain offenses, or are sufficient to impeach his
honesty, virtue or reputation, or to hold him up to public ridicule. (U.S. vs. O’Connell, 37 Phil. 767)
Malice
has been defined as a term used to indicate the fact that the defamer is
prompted by personal ill or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely
to injure the reputation of the person defamed.
Kinds of Malice.
Malice
in law – This is assumed and is inferred from the
defamatory character of an imputation. The presumption of malice attaches to
the defamatory statement especially if it appears to be insulting per se. The law presumes that the
defamer made the imputation without good intention or justifiable motive.
Malice
in fact – This refers to malice as a fact. The
presence and existence of personal ill-will or spite may still appear even if
the statement is not defamatory. So, where the defamatory acts may be presumed
from the publication of the defamatory acts imputed refer to the private life
of the individual, malice may be presumed from the publication of the defamatory
statement because no one has a right to invade another’s privacy.
Distinction between malice in fact and malice in law
Malice in fact is the malice
which the law presumes from every statement whose tenor is defamatory. It does not need proof. The mere fact that the utterance or statement
is defamatory negates a legal presumption of malice.
In the crime of
libel, which includes oral defamation, there is no need for the prosecution
to present evidence of malice. It is enough that the alleged defamatory or
libelous statement be presented to the court verbatim. It is the court which will prove whether it
is defamatory or not. If the tenor of
the utterance or statement is defamatory, the
legal presumption of malice arises even without proof.
Malice in fact
becomes necessary only if the malice in law has been rebutted. Otherwise, there is no need to adduce
evidence of malice in fact. So, while
malice in law does not require evidence, malice in fact requires evidence.
Malice in law can be negated by
evidence that, in fact, the alleged libelous or defamatory utterance was made
with good motives and justifiable ends or by the fact that the utterance was
privileged in character.
In law, however, the privileged
character of a defamatory statement may be absolute or qualified.
When the
privileged character is said to be absolute, the statement will not be
actionable whether criminal or civil because that means the law does not allow
prosecution on an action based thereon.
Illustration:
As regards the statements made by
Congressmen while they are deliberating or discussing in Congress, when the
privileged character is qualified, proof of malice in fact will be admitted to
take the place of malice in law. When
the defamatory statement or utterance is qualifiedly privileged, the malice in
law is negated. The
utterance or statement would not be actionable because malice in law does not
exist. Therefore, for the complainant to
prosecute the accused for libel, oral defamation or slander, he has to prove
that the accused was actuated with malice (malice in fact) in making the
statement.
* Where the
imputation is based upon matters of public interest, the presumption of malice
does not arise from the mere publication of the defamatory statement. A matter
of public interest is common property.
Malice in fact comes into play when the statement made is not defamatory
per se, as when the offender resorts
to underserved praises or satirical method of impeaching the virtue, honesty
and reputation of the offended party. It can also appear in the form of innuendos.
* This discussion
leads to the conclusion that the determination of libelous meaning is left to
the good judgment of the court after considering all the circumstances which
lead to the utterance or publication of the defamatory statement. The question
is not what the writer of an alleged libel means but what the words used by him
mean. The meaning given by the writer or the words used by him is immaterial.
The question is not what the writer meant but what he conveyed to those who
heard or read him (People vs. Encarnacion, 204 SCRA 1)
How to overcome the presumption of malice.
The presumption of
malice is rebutted by showing :
1.
that the accused published the defamatory imputation with good
intention;
2.
that there is justifiable motive for making it;
3.
that the communication made is privileged; and
4.
accused must prove the truth of the defamatory imputation in those cases
wherein truth is a defense.
Publication
is the communication of the defamatory matter to a third person or persons. So,
the delivery of a defamatory writing to a typesetter is sufficient publication.
Writing a letter to another person other than the person defamed is sufficient
publication. (See Sazon vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 692)
> The crime is libel if the
defamation is in writing or printed media.
> The crime is slander or oral
defamation if it is not printed.
* When a libel is
addressed to several persons, unless they are identified in the same libel,
even if there are several persons offended by the libelous utterance or
statement, there will only be one count of libel.
* If the offended
parties in the libel were distinctly identified, even though the libel was
committed at one and the same time, there will be as many libels as
there are persons dishonored.
Illustration:
If a person uttered that “All the
Marcoses are thieves," there will only be one libel because these
particular Marcoses regarded as thieves are not specifically identified.
If the offender said, “All the Marcoses – the father, mother and
daughter are thieves.” There will be
three counts of libel because each person libeled is distinctly dishonored.
* If you do not know the
particular persons libeled, you cannot consider one libel as giving rise to
several counts of libel.
In order that one defamatory utterance or imputation may be considered
as having dishonored more than one person, those persons dishonored must be
identified. Otherwise, there will only
be one count of libel.
* Note that in libel, the person
defamed need not be expressly identified.
It is enough that he could possibly be identified because “innuendos may
also be a basis for prosecution for libel.
As a matter of fact, even a compliment which is undeserved, has been
held to be libelous.
Republication of
defamatory article is punishable.
One is liable for
publication of defamatory words against another although he is only repeating
what he heard and names the source of his information. A person who repeats a
slander or libelous publication heard or read from another is presumed to
indorse it. (People
vs. Salumbides and Reanzares ,
C.A. , 55 O.G.
2638)
Criterion to determine whether statements are defamatory
1) words are
calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person
against who they are uttered were guilty of certain offenses, or are sufficient
to impeach their honesty, virtue or reputation, or to hold the person up to
public ridicule(US v O’Connel)
2 )construed not
only as to the expression used but also with respect to the whole scope and
apparent object of the writer.(P v
Encarnacion)
* The test of libelous meanings is not the analysis
of a sentence into component phrases with the meticulous care of the grammarian
or stylist, but the import conveyed by the entirety of the language to the
ordinary reader. (Lacsa vs. FAC,
et al., 161 SCRA 427).
* In libel cases, the question is not what the
offender means but what the words used by him mean. ( Sazon vs. CA, 255 SCRA 692)
Praises undeserved
are slander in disguise.
Where the comments
are worded in praise of the plaintiff, like describing him with qualities which
plaintiff does not deserve because of his social, political and economic status
in the community which is too well known to all concerned, are which intended
are intended to ridicule rather than praise him, the publication is deemed
libelous (Jimenez
vs. Reyes, 27 SCRA 52)
* Even if what was
imputed is true, the crime of libel is committed unless one acted with good
motives or justifiable end. Poof of
truth of a defamatory imputation is not even admissible in evidence, unless
what was imputed pertains to an act which constitutes a crime and when the
person to whom the imputation was made is a public officer and the imputation
pertains to the performance of official duty.
Other than these, the imputation is not admissible.
When proof of truth is admissible
1. When the act or omission imputed
constitutes a crime regardless of whether the offended party is a private
individual or a public officer;
2. When the offended party is a government
employee, even if the act or omission imputed does not constitute a crime,
provided if its related to the discharged of his official duties.
Requisites of defense in defamation
1. If it appears that the matter charged
as libelous is true;
2. It was published with good motives;
3. It was for justifiable ends.
If a crime is a private
crime, it cannot be prosecuted de officio. A complaint from the offended party is
necessary.
Libel
|
Perjury
|
-false accusation need not be made under oath
|
-false accusation is made under oath
|
Newsweek v IAC
Newsweek portrayed the island province of Negros
Occidental as a place dominated by big
landowners. Plaintiffs are associations of sugarcane planters. HELD:
Dismissed. To maintain a libel suit, the specific victim must be
identifiable. Defamatory remarks directed at a group of persons are not
actionable unless the statements are all-embracing or sufficiently specific for
victim to be identifiable. An action for libel allegedly directed against a
group of sugar planters cannot be done by resort to filing a class suit as each
victim has his specific reputation to protect. In this case, each of the
plaintiffs has a separate and distinct reputation in the community.
Rule regarding Public Officers:
Defamatory remarks and
comments on the conduct or acts of public officers which are related to the
discharge of their official duties will not constitute libel if the accused
proves the truth of the imputation. But
any attack upon the private character of the public officers on matters which
are not related to the discharge of their official functions may constitute
Libel.
* Where malice
cannot be inferred from false defamatory statements, the ruling appears to be
the true only if the offended party is a government employee, with respect to
facts related to the discharge of his official duties. With his jurisprudence,
it should now be emphasized that ‘actual
malice” is now required to be proven. It is enough to rely on presumed
malice in libel cases involving a public official or public figure.
* Malice
is now understood to mean publication with knowledge of falsehood or reckless
disregard of the statement’s veracity. The burden of proof has not only been
shifted to the plaintiff in libel, but proof has not only been shifted to the
plaintiff in libel, but proof of malice must now be clear and convincing.
Case Doctrines:
* The fact that a
communication is privileged is not a proper ground for the dismissal of a
complaint for libel. In the first place, it is a matter of defense. Secondly,
the fact that a communication is privileged does not mean that it is not
actionable. The privileged character simply does away with the presumption
of malice which the prosecution has to prove in such a case. (Lu Chu
Sing, et al., vs. Lu Tiong Gui, 76 Phil. 669)
* Libel in answer
to another libel is not a defense. (Pellicena vs. Gonzales, 6 Phil. 50)
* If the
defamatory imputation is in the nature of self-defense under Article 11 of the
Revised Penal Code such that the publication was done in good faith, without
malice and just adequate enough to protect his good name, the statement may be
considered privileged. (People vs. Baja, 40 O.G. 206; People vs. Mendoza , C.A.
74 O.G. 5607)
* The fair and
true report of official proceedings refer to proceedings in the three branches
of government, to wit: judicial, legislative and executive. The publisher is
limited only to the narration of what had taken place even if the report
contains defamatory and injurious matter affecting another person, libel is not
committed for as long as what is contained is a fair and true report of the
proceedings.
* Under Article
354, the publisher becomes liable when he makes comments or remarks upon the
private character of person, which are not relevant or related to the judicial,
legislative or executive proceedings.
* Under our libel
law, defamatory remarks against government employees with respect to facts
related to the discharge of their official duties will not constitute libel, if
defendant is able to prove the truth of the imputations. But any attack on the
private character of the officer on matters which are not related to the
discharge of his official functions may constitute libel since under our laws,
the right of the press to criticize public officers does not authorize
defamation. (U.S.
vs. Bustos, supra; Sazon vs. Court of Appeals, supra).
Article354
REQUIREMENT OF PUBLICITY
Kinds of privileged communication
a. ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED – not actionable even if the actor has
acted in bad faith
b. QUALIFIEDLY PRIVILEGED – those which although containing
defamatory imputations could not be actionable unless made with malice or bad
faith
*
When the defamatory imputation comes under the criteria of an absolute
privileged communication, the presumption of malice under Article 354 has no
application.
* The presumption
of malice, however, comes into play when the defamatory statement is a
conditional or qualified privileged communication. To overcome this presumption
of malice in law, the defamer must prove during the proceeding that the
defamatory imputation was committed because of a legal, moral or social duty.
* Privileged
communication as categorized in this discussion is a matter of defense. It is
not a ground for a motion to quash after the arraignment of the accused. (See Mercado vs. CFI of
Rizal, 116 SCRA 93). If after the prosecution has
presented its evidence, it becomes evident that the defamatory statement was
made by the accused because of a legal, moral or social duty, then the accused
can file a demurrer to evidence, as in the meantime, there is absence of malice
in law which is presumed in all defamatory imputations.
GENERAL RULE: Every defamatory imputation is
presumed malicious even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable
motive for making it is shown
EXCEPTION:
a. private communication in
performance of legal, moral or social duty
Requisites
1.
that
the person who made the communication had a legal, moral or social duty to make
the communication or at least he had an interest to be upheld
2.
that
the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having
some interest or duty on the matter
3.
that
the statements in the communication are made in good faith without malice in
fact
b. fair and true report, made
in good faith, without any comments and remarks
Requisites
1.
that
the publication of a report of an official proceeding is a fair and true report
of a judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of
confidential nature, or of a statement, report, or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by a public officer
2.
that
it is made in good faith
3.
that
it is made without any comments or remarks
Doctrine of fair
comment
“A fair comment on
matters of public interest is included and is covered by the mantle of
privileged communication which constitutes a valid defense against libel and slander.”
“If the comment is an expression of opinion based on established facts, then
it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might
be reasonably inferred from the facts.” Further explaining the right to
comment on a public issue, the Court said, “If a matter is a subject of public
or general interest, it cannot become less so merely because a private
individual is involved. The public primary interest is in the event; the public
focus is on the conduct of the participants and not on their prior anonymity or
notoriety. (
Borjal vs. CA, 301 SCRA 1 )
HELD:
No malice, he simply furnished the readers with the info that a complaint has
been filed against the brokerage firm and reproduced the pleading verbatim with
no embellishments.
Article 355
LIBEL BY MEANS OF WRITING OR SIMILAR
MEANS
A libel may
be committed by means of –
1. Writing;
2. Printing;
3. Lithography;
4. Engraving;
5. Radio;
6. Photograph;
7. Painting;
8. Theatrical
exhibition;
9. Cinematographic
exhibition; or
10. Any similar
means.
* In the
enumeration above, television is not included, probably because at the
time the Revised Penal Code was conceived, television had not yet been
invented. However, the law provides, “or
any similar means” which easily qualifies television is such species or
category. (People
vs. Casten, C.A., G.R. No. 07924-CR promulgated December 13, 1974)
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