Tuesday, June 5, 2012

What is Libel?


LIBEL

ELEMENTS:
1.      That there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstances.

2.      That the imputation must be made publicly.

3.      That it must be malicious.

4.      That the imputation must be directed at a natural or juridical person, or one who is dead.

5.      That the imputation must tend to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of the person defamed.

Notes:

LIBEL is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, commission, condition, status or circumstances tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead

Character of the words used to make it defamatory.

Words calculated to induce suspicion are more effective in destroying reputation than false charges directly made. Ironical and metaphorical language is a favored vehicle for slander. A charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearer to suppose and understand that the person against whom they are uttered is guilty of certain offenses, or are sufficient to impeach his honesty, virtue or reputation, or to hold him up to public ridicule. (U.S. vs. O’Connell, 37 Phil. 767)

Malice has been defined as a term used to indicate the fact that the defamer is prompted by personal ill or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed.

Kinds of Malice.

Malice in law – This is assumed and is inferred from the defamatory character of an imputation. The presumption of malice attaches to the defamatory statement especially if it appears to be insulting per se. The law presumes that the defamer made the imputation without good intention or justifiable motive.

Malice in fact – This refers to malice as a fact. The presence and existence of personal ill-will or spite may still appear even if the statement is not defamatory. So, where the defamatory acts may be presumed from the publication of the defamatory acts imputed refer to the private life of the individual, malice may be presumed from the publication of the defamatory statement because no one has a right to invade another’s privacy.

Distinction between malice in fact and malice in law


Malice in fact is the malice which the law presumes from every statement whose tenor is defamatory.  It does not need proof.  The mere fact that the utterance or statement is defamatory negates a legal presumption of malice.

In the crime of libel, which includes oral defamation, there is no need for the prosecution to  present evidence of malice.  It is enough that the alleged defamatory or libelous statement be presented to the court verbatim.  It is the court which will prove whether it is defamatory or not.  If the tenor of the utterance or statement is defamatory, the  legal presumption of malice arises even without proof.

Malice in fact becomes necessary only if the malice in law has been rebutted.  Otherwise, there is no need to adduce evidence of malice in fact.  So, while malice in law does not require evidence, malice in fact requires evidence.

Malice in law can be negated by evidence that, in fact, the alleged libelous or defamatory utterance was made with good motives and justifiable ends or by the fact that the utterance was privileged in character.

In law, however, the privileged character of a defamatory statement may be absolute or qualified.

When the privileged character is said to be absolute, the statement will not be actionable whether criminal or civil because that means the law does not allow prosecution on an action based thereon.

Illustration:
As regards the statements made by Congressmen while they are deliberating or discussing in Congress, when the privileged character is qualified, proof of malice in fact will be admitted to take the place of malice in law.  When the defamatory statement or utterance is qualifiedly privileged, the malice in law is negated.  The utterance or statement would not be actionable because malice in law does not exist.  Therefore, for the complainant to prosecute the accused for libel, oral defamation or slander, he has to prove that the accused was actuated with malice (malice in fact) in making the statement.

* Malice is presumed to exist in injurious publications

* Where the imputation is based upon matters of public interest, the presumption of malice does not arise from the mere publication of the defamatory statement. A matter of public interest is common property.  Malice in fact comes into play when the statement made is not defamatory per se, as when the offender resorts to underserved praises or satirical method of impeaching the virtue, honesty and reputation of the offended party. It can also appear in the form of innuendos.

* This discussion leads to the conclusion that the determination of libelous meaning is left to the good judgment of the court after considering all the circumstances which lead to the utterance or publication of the defamatory statement. The question is not what the writer of an alleged libel means but what the words used by him mean. The meaning given by the writer or the words used by him is immaterial. The question is not what the writer meant but what he conveyed to those who heard or read him (People vs. Encarnacion, 204 SCRA 1)

How to overcome the presumption of malice.

The presumption of malice is rebutted by showing :

1.   that the accused published the defamatory imputation with good intention;

2.   that there is justifiable motive for making it;

3.   that the communication made is privileged; and

4.  accused must prove the truth of the defamatory imputation in those cases wherein truth is a defense.

PUBLICATION is the communication of the defamatory matter to some third person/s

Publication is the communication of the defamatory matter to a third person or persons. So, the delivery of a defamatory writing to a typesetter is sufficient publication. Writing a letter to another person other than the person defamed is sufficient publication. (See Sazon vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 692)

> The crime is libel if the defamation is in writing or printed media.

> The crime is slander or oral defamation if it is not printed.

* Person libeled must be identified. But the publication need not refer by name to the libeled party. If not named it must be shown that the description of the person referred to in the defamatory publication was sufficiently clear so that at least a 3rd person would have identified the plaintiff.

* When a libel is addressed to several persons, unless they are identified in the same libel, even if there are several persons offended by the libelous utterance or statement, there will only be one count of libel.

* If the offended parties in the libel were distinctly identified, even though the libel was committed at one and the same time, there will be as many libels as there are persons dishonored.

Illustration:

If a person uttered that “All the Marcoses are thieves," there will only be one libel because these particular Marcoses regarded as thieves are not specifically identified.

If the offender said,  “All the Marcoses – the father, mother and daughter are thieves.”  There will be three counts of libel because each person libeled is distinctly dishonored.

* If you do not know the particular persons libeled, you cannot consider one libel as giving rise to several counts of libel.  In order that one defamatory utterance or imputation may be considered as having dishonored more than one person, those persons dishonored must be identified.  Otherwise, there will only be one count of libel.

* Note that in libel, the person defamed need not be expressly identified.  It is enough that he could possibly be identified because “innuendos may also be a basis for prosecution for libel.  As a matter of fact, even a compliment which is undeserved, has been held to be libelous.
* To presume publication there must be a reasonable probability that the alleged a libelous matter was thereby exposed to be read or seen by 3rd persons.

Republication of defamatory article is punishable.

One is liable for publication of defamatory words against another although he is only repeating what he heard and names the source of his information. A person who repeats a slander or libelous publication heard or read from another is presumed to indorse it. (People vs. Salumbides and Reanzares, C.A., 55 O.G. 2638)

Criterion to determine whether statements are defamatory

1) words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person against who they are uttered were guilty of certain offenses, or are sufficient to impeach their honesty, virtue or reputation, or to hold the person up to public ridicule(US v O’Connel)

2 )construed not only as to the expression used but also with respect to the whole scope and apparent object of the writer.(P v Encarnacion)

* The test of libelous meanings is not the analysis of a sentence into component phrases with the meticulous care of the grammarian or stylist, but the import conveyed by the entirety of the language to the ordinary reader.  (Lacsa vs. FAC, et al., 161 SCRA 427).

* In libel cases, the question is not what the offender means but what the words used by him mean. ( Sazon vs. CA, 255 SCRA 692)

Praises undeserved are slander in disguise.
                                            
Where the comments are worded in praise of the plaintiff, like describing him with qualities which plaintiff does not deserve because of his social, political and economic status in the community which is too well known to all concerned, are which intended are intended to ridicule rather than praise him, the publication is deemed libelous (Jimenez vs. Reyes, 27 SCRA 52)

* Even if what was imputed is true, the crime of libel is committed unless one acted with good motives or justifiable end.  Poof of truth of a defamatory imputation is not even admissible in evidence, unless what was imputed pertains to an act which constitutes a crime and when the person to whom the imputation was made is a public officer and the imputation pertains to the performance of official duty.  Other than these, the imputation is not admissible.

When proof of truth is admissible


1.         When the act or omission imputed constitutes a crime regardless of whether the offended party is a private individual or a public officer;

2.         When the offended party is a government employee, even if the act or omission imputed does not constitute a crime, provided if its related to the discharged of his official duties.

Requisites of defense in defamation


1.         If it appears that the matter charged as libelous is true;

2.         It was published with good motives;

3.         It was for justifiable ends.


If a crime is a private crime, it cannot be prosecuted de officio.  A complaint from the offended party is necessary.

Libel
Perjury
-false accusation need not be made under oath

-false accusation is made under oath


Newsweek v IAC
Newsweek portrayed the island province of Negros Occidental as a place dominated by big landowners. Plaintiffs are associations of sugarcane planters. HELD: Dismissed. To maintain a libel suit, the specific victim must be identifiable. Defamatory remarks directed at a group of persons are not actionable unless the statements are all-embracing or sufficiently specific for victim to be identifiable. An action for libel allegedly directed against a group of sugar planters cannot be done by resort to filing a class suit as each victim has his specific reputation to protect. In this case, each of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct reputation in the community.

Rule regarding Public Officers:

Defamatory remarks and comments on the conduct or acts of public officers which are related to the discharge of their official duties will not constitute libel if the accused proves the truth of the imputation.  But any attack upon the private character of the public officers on matters which are not related to the discharge of their official functions may constitute Libel.

* Where malice cannot be inferred from false defamatory statements, the ruling appears to be the true only if the offended party is a government employee, with respect to facts related to the discharge of his official duties. With his jurisprudence, it should now be emphasized that ‘actual malice” is now required to be proven. It is enough to rely on presumed malice in libel cases involving a public official or public figure.

* Malice is now understood to mean publication with knowledge of falsehood or reckless disregard of the statement’s veracity. The burden of proof has not only been shifted to the plaintiff in libel, but proof has not only been shifted to the plaintiff in libel, but proof of malice must now be clear and convincing.

Case Doctrines:

* The fact that a communication is privileged is not a proper ground for the dismissal of a complaint for libel. In the first place, it is a matter of defense. Secondly, the fact that a communication is privileged does not mean that it is not actionable. The privileged character simply does away with the presumption of malice which the prosecution has to prove in such a case. (Lu Chu Sing, et al., vs. Lu Tiong Gui, 76 Phil. 669)

* Libel in answer to another libel is not a defense. (Pellicena vs. Gonzales, 6 Phil. 50)

* If the defamatory imputation is in the nature of self-defense under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code such that the publication was done in good faith, without malice and just adequate enough to protect his good name, the statement may be considered privileged. (People vs. Baja, 40 O.G. 206; People vs. Mendoza, C.A. 74 O.G. 5607)

* The fair and true report of official proceedings refer to proceedings in the three branches of government, to wit: judicial, legislative and executive. The publisher is limited only to the narration of what had taken place even if the report contains defamatory and injurious matter affecting another person, libel is not committed for as long as what is contained is a fair and true report of the proceedings.

* Under Article 354, the publisher becomes liable when he makes comments or remarks upon the private character of person, which are not relevant or related to the judicial, legislative or executive proceedings.

* Under our libel law, defamatory remarks against government employees with respect to facts related to the discharge of their official duties will not constitute libel, if defendant is able to prove the truth of the imputations. But any attack on the private character of the officer on matters which are not related to the discharge of his official functions may constitute libel since under our laws, the right of the press to criticize public officers does not authorize defamation. (U.S. vs. Bustos, supra; Sazon vs. Court of Appeals, supra).




Article354
REQUIREMENT OF PUBLICITY

Kinds of privileged communication

a.    ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED – not actionable even if the actor has acted in bad faith

b.    QUALIFIEDLY PRIVILEGED – those which although containing defamatory imputations could not be actionable unless made with malice or bad faith

* When the defamatory imputation comes under the criteria of an absolute privileged communication, the presumption of malice under Article 354 has no application.

* The presumption of malice, however, comes into play when the defamatory statement is a conditional or qualified privileged communication. To overcome this presumption of malice in law, the defamer must prove during the proceeding that the defamatory imputation was committed because of a legal, moral or social duty.

* Privileged communication as categorized in this discussion is a matter of defense. It is not a ground for a motion to quash after the arraignment of the accused. (See Mercado vs. CFI of Rizal, 116 SCRA 93). If after the prosecution has presented its evidence, it becomes evident that the defamatory statement was made by the accused because of a legal, moral or social duty, then the accused can file a demurrer to evidence, as in the meantime, there is absence of malice in law which is presumed in all defamatory imputations.

GENERAL RULE: Every defamatory imputation is presumed malicious even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown

EXCEPTION:
a.      private communication in performance of legal, moral or social duty

Requisites
1.    that the person who made the communication had a legal, moral or social duty to make the communication or at least he had an interest to be upheld

2.    that the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty on the matter

3.    that the statements in the communication are made in good faith without malice in fact

b.      fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments and remarks

Requisites
1.    that the publication of a report of an official proceeding is a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of a statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by a public officer

2.    that it is made in good faith

3.    that it is made without any comments or remarks

Doctrine of fair comment

“A fair comment on matters of public interest is included and is covered by the mantle of privileged communication which constitutes a valid defense against libel and slander.” “If the comment is an expression of opinion based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might be reasonably inferred from the facts.” Further explaining the right to comment on a public issue, the Court said, “If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot become less so merely because a private individual is involved. The public primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participants and not on their prior anonymity or notoriety. ( Borjal vs. CA, 301 SCRA 1 )

Santos v CA
HELD: No malice, he simply furnished the readers with the info that a complaint has been filed against the brokerage firm and reproduced the pleading verbatim with no embellishments.


Article 355
LIBEL BY MEANS OF WRITING OR SIMILAR MEANS

A libel may be committed by means of –


1.         Writing;

2.         Printing;

3.         Lithography;

4.         Engraving;

5.         Radio;

6.         Photograph;

7.         Painting;

8.         Theatrical exhibition;

9.         Cinematographic exhibition; or

10.        Any similar means.

* In the enumeration above, television is not included, probably because at the time the Revised Penal Code was conceived, television had not yet been invented. However, the law provides, “or any similar means” which easily qualifies television is such species or category. (People vs. Casten, C.A., G.R. No. 07924-CR promulgated December 13, 1974)

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