Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Lucita Suyom, Marissa Enano, Myrna Tamayo and Felix Oledan

Equitable Leasing Corporation vs. Lucita Suyom, Marissa Enano, Myrna Tamayo and Felix Oledan

FACTS:

                       

A tractor driven by Raul Tutor rammed into a house-cum-store in Tondo, Manila. Part of the house was destroyed. Two people died and four were injured. Tutor was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries.Verification with the Land Transportation Office revealed that the registered owner of the tractor was Equitable Leasing Corporation who leased it to Edwin Lim. The relatives of the victims filed a civil case for damages.The Regional Trial Court ruled against Equitable and ordered it to pay damages to the victims’ relatives. Upon Equitable’s appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the RTC. Equitable filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:           Whether Equitable Leasing is liable for damages

RULING:

Yes, Equitable Leasing is liable. The petition is denied and the CA decision is affirmed.As the registered owner of the tractor, Equitable Leasing is liable for the acts of Raul Tutor even if he was actually the employee of Equitable’s former lessee, Ecatine Corporation, who became the actual owner of the tractor by virtue of a deed of sale not registered with the LTO.

Regardless of sales made of a motor vehicle, the registered owner is the lawful operator insofar as the public and third persons are concerned; consequently, it is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences of its operation. In the eyes of the law, the owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual owner/operator being considered as merely the agent of the registered owner/operator. The principle applies even if the registered owner of any vehicle does not use it for public service.The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle, responsibility can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Failure to register the deed of sale should not prejudice victims, who have the right to rely on the principle that the registered owner is liable for damages caused by the negligence of the driver.

Equitable Leasing can’t hide behind the allegation that Tutor was Ecatine Corp’s employee, because it will prevent victims from recovering their loss on the basis of Equitable’s inaction in failing to register the sale. The non-registration is Equitable’s fault, which should face the legal consequences thereof. 

AMADO PICART v. FRANK SMITH, JR.

AMADO PICART v. FRANK SMITH, JR.

FACTS:

On 12 December 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La Union, Amado Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Frank Smith Jr. approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about 10 or 12 miles per hour. As Smith neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road. Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left.  As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing Smith assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. The pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, Smith, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, Smith quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it was then standing; but in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. As a result of its injuries the horse died. Picart received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.

ISSUE:           Whether or not Smith is guilty of negligence.

RULING:

Yes. Smith, in maneuvering his car in the manner described, was guilty of negligence such that it gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done. In the nature of things the control of the situation had passed entirely to Smith, and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, Smith ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse. When Smith exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was negligent in the eye of the law.

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.

What would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculation cannot be of much value; as reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them, and hence they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger.  Reasonable foresight of harm is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. In fine, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences